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**ARTICLE:** The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000-2008

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**LEXISNEXIS SUMMARY:**

... Executives' Losses from the Fall of Their Banks The top executives of Bear Stearns and Lehman held substantial amounts of their companies' shares. ... Implications We have seen that during 2000-2008 the top executive teams received large amounts of performance-based compensation, which were large enough to provide them with net positive payoffs for the period, after accounting for the losses they suffered on their holdings at the beginning of this period. ... Similarly, the cashing out of large amounts of shares and options by executives throughout the period provided those executives with incentives to place significant weight on the effect of their decisions on short-term stock prices. ... Moreover, to the extent that the top executives of Bear Stearns and

Lehman were "excessively optimistic" and did not, say, perceive any risks to their firms, their behavior would have been the same whether or not they had incentives to take excessive risks. ... Such arrangements would prevent executives from pocketing in their entirety bonuses based on results in a given year when the results do not hold afterwards.

**TEXT:**

[\*258]

Introduction

In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008-2009, many believe that executive pay arrangements might have encouraged excessive risk-taking and that fixing those arrangements will be important in preventing similar excesses in the future. n1 These beliefs have led firms and public officials to seek compensation reforms that would eliminate excessive incentives to take risks. For those companies receiving government aid, the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) bill, subsequent U.S. legislation, n2 and regulations implementing such legislation n3 require the elimination of compensation structures that provide excessive risk-taking incentives. Furthermore, legislators and regulators have moved toward regulating compensation structures in all financial firms to eliminate such incentives. The U.S. House of Representatives voted in favor of a bill (now to be taken up by the Senate) authorizing such regulations, n4 and the Federal Reserve Board requested comments on a proposed guidance contemplating scrutiny of pay arrangements by banking supervisors. n5 G-20 leaders stressed the importance of such reforms, and made a commitment in their September 2009 meeting "to act together to ... implement strong [\*259] international compensation standards aimed at ending practices that lead to excessive risk-taking." n6

At the same time, some commentators take opposing views. They dismiss the possibility that incentives generated by pay arrangements played a significant role in the risk-taking decisions that financial firms made in the years preceding the financial crisis; and they have dismissed as well the potential payoffs from reforming such pay arrangements. These commentators stress that financial firms' executives suffered significant losses when the stock prices of their firms fell sharply. n7 In these commentators' view, the losses imply that, to the extent executives took excessive risks, such risk-taking resulted fully from mistakes - excessive optimism, failure to perceive risks, or even hubris - rather than from incentives. The losses suffered by financial executives during the crisis, so the argument goes, indicate that "incentives cannot be blamed for the credit crisis or for the performance of banks" and that executives "managed their banks in a manner that they authentically believed would benefit their shareholders." n8

Commentators dismissing the role of incentives and the potential value of fixing them have made substantial use of the examples of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers ("Lehman"). n9 Bear Stearns sold itself in a fire sale to JPMorgan in March 2008, and half a year later Lehman filed for bankruptcy, triggering a worldwide panic. According to the standard narrative of these financial disasters, the wealth of the two companies' top executives was largely wiped out with their firms. This narrative has led observers to infer that risk-taking decisions made by the firms' top executives (ultimately leading to the firms' demise) must have been due to failure to perceive risks.

This Article presents an analysis of executive compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman during the period 2000-2008. Using data from SEC filings, we find that the standard narrative's assumption is incorrect. During the examined period, the companies' top executives were able to pocket large

amounts of performance-based compensation. Overall, we estimate that the top executive teams of Bear Stearns and Lehman derived cash flows of about \$ 1.4 billion and \$ 1 billion respectively from cash bonuses and equity sales during 2000-2008. These cash flows substantially [\*260] exceeded the value of the executives' initial holdings at the beginning of the period. As a result, the bottom-line payoffs of these executives during 2000-2008 were not negative but rather decidedly positive. Our analysis has implications for the continuing debates on whether financial executives had incentives to take excessive risks and whether pay arrangements need to be restructured.

Part I introduces the teams of top executives whose compensation is analyzed in this piece. During 2000-2008, the composition of the top-five-executive teams remained largely stable at both Bear Stearns and Lehman. The shareholder payoffs these teams produced were indisputably poor; shareholders who held their shares throughout the period lost most of their initial investment.

Part II discusses the large paper losses on shares held that the top teams suffered when their firms melted down - the losses on which the standard narrative focuses. We observe, however, that these losses do not tell the full story of the executives' payoffs. To get a more complete understanding of how the executives fared as a result of the management of their firms during 2000-2008, and the incentives they had during this period, it is necessary to calculate what they cashed out during these years, as well as what they had to begin with.

Part III examines the cash bonus compensation the top executives took out during 2000-2008. Although the financial deterioration in 2007 led Bear Stearns to stop paying bonuses and Lehman to reduce them, the executives had already pocketed in prior years large amounts of cash bonus compensation. In the aggregate, during 2000-2008, the top-five teams of Bear Stearns and Lehman accumulated cash bonus payments exceeding \$ 300 million and \$ 150 million respectively (all dollar figures in this Article are in January 2009 dollars). Although the financial results on which bonus payments were based sharply reversed at the end of the 2000-2008 period, the firms' pay arrangements allowed the executives to keep all bonus compensation already paid; no amounts were clawed back.

Part IV examines what the executives obtained from cashing out shares and options during 2000-2008. During this period, and in contrast to the standard narrative, n10 the executives regularly took large amounts of money off the table by unloading shares and options. Overall, based on information contained in executives' filings of their trades, we estimate that during 2000-2008 the top-five-executive teams at Bear Stearns and Lehman cashed out total amounts of about \$ 1.1 billion and \$ 850 million respectively. Indeed, we find that during the years preceding the firms' collapse, each of the teams sold more shares than they held when the music stopped in 2008.

[\*261] Part V focuses on the bottom line. Altogether from 2000-2008, the firms' performance-based compensation structures provided the teams of top executives at Bear Stearns and Lehman with cash flows of about \$ 1.4 billion and \$ 1 billion, respectively. We observe that these amounts substantially exceed the value of the top executives' positions at the beginning of 2000, which we estimate to be on the order of \$ 800 million and \$ 600 million respectively. To be sure, the executives would have made much more had the firms not collapsed. In contrast to shareholders who held their shares throughout 2000-2008, however, the executives' bottom-line payoffs during the same period were significantly positive.

Part VI discusses the implications that our analysis has for the ongoing debate on the potential role that pay incentives played in risk-taking decisions. Our analysis does not support the view that

the executives' losses from the firms' collapse imply that they could not have had incentives to take excessive risks. The fact that the executives chose not to sell all of their holdings indicates that they did not anticipate the firms' 2008 collapse. But the executives taking large amounts of performance-based compensation off the table based on short-term results did provide them with undesirable incentives - incentives to seek improvements in short-term results even at the cost of an excessive elevation of the risk of large losses at some (uncertain) point in the future. To be sure, even though the executives had incentives to take excessive risks, their decisions might have been driven by a failure to recognize risks, and thus might have not been affected by those incentives. But given the structure of executives' payoffs, the possibility that risk-taking decisions were influenced by incentives should not be dismissed, but rather, should be taken seriously.

The Conclusion discusses the implications of our analysis for the reform of compensation structures. Even if the excessive risk-taking incentives that executives of Bear Stearns, Lehman, and other financial firms had were not a major driver of risk-taking in the years preceding the financial crisis, such incentives could become so in the future if retained. Our analysis highlights the potential value of reforms that tie executive payoffs to long-term results more effectively and eliminate or curtail executives' ability to benefit from short-term results.

### I. The Executive Teams and Their Performance

For both Bear Stearns and Lehman, we focus on the five "named executive officers" (NEOs) in 2007 - those executive officers for whom, in 2007, compensation needed to be disclosed in the annual proxy statement under U.S. securities law: the CEO, the CFO, and the three other most highly paid executive officers. n11 As it turns out, all of these executives held key [\*262] managerial or board positions with their firms throughout all or most of the 2000-2008 period.

Some members of these teams as we define them were not technically NEOs for each of the years 2000-2008, which means their compensation was not disclosed for the entire 2000-2008 period. n12 To be conservative, we generally count compensation during years of missing information as zero, which biases our aggregate compensation numbers downward. n13 We could have avoided these problems by looking at all the NEOs in any given year, but incentives operate at the level of individuals, so looking at a group with changing membership might produce misleading conclusions. We therefore chose to look at the incentives of five individuals who served as top executives during all or most of the relevant period.

As Figure 1 shows, the executive teams initially produced stellar returns, quadrupling their firms' stock prices from January 2000 to January 2007. As is well known, however, in the next fifteen to twenty-one months both stocks collapsed. Bear Stearns was forced to sell itself to JPMorgan in March 2008 for a per share price equal to about a quarter of the January 2000 stock price. Lehman filed for bankruptcy in September 2008. Shareholders holding the companies' shares from 2000 to 2008 lost most of the value of their 2000 positions.

[\*263]

Figure 1. 2000-2008 PERFORMANCE

[SEE FIGURE 1 IN ORIGINAL]

### II. Executives' Losses from the Fall of Their Banks

The top executives of Bear Stearns and Lehman held substantial amounts of their companies' shares. Relative to what those shares were worth at the peak stock prices both firms reached in early 2007, the executives suffered very substantial paper losses when their companies collapsed.

For example, the chairman of the board and, until January 2008, CEO of Bear Stearns held 5.6 million shares of Bear Stearns at the time of its emergency sale to JPMorgan in March 2008. At the then-current price of \$ 10.84, he obtained \$ 61 million for these shares.<sup>n14</sup> By contrast, at the peak stock price of \$ 171.51 on January 12, 2007, the same shares were worth \$ 963 million.<sup>n15</sup> This amounts to a paper loss of over \$ 900 million.<sup>n16</sup>

**[\*264]** Similarly, the chairman of the board and CEO of Lehman held, directly or indirectly, more than 10.8 million shares as of January 31, 2008.<sup>n17</sup> When Lehman filed for bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, those shares became worthless.<sup>n18</sup> Compared to the peak stock price of \$ 85.80 on February 2, 2007,<sup>n19</sup> this amounted to a paper loss of about \$ 931 million.

As noted in the Introduction, commentators have pointed to these paper losses as evidence that bank executives' pay incentives could not have played a role in the earlier risk-taking incentives that resulted in the firms' demise. Executives ending up with such losses must have failed to perceive the risks their firms faced, so the argument goes, and their risk-taking must have been driven entirely by excessive optimism or even hubris, not by perverse incentives. Indeed, an examination of the fate of Lehman's CEO was a primary basis for the conclusion reached by New York Times columnist Floyd Norris that "Wall Street pay didn't cause this crisis."<sup>n20</sup> Norris stressed that the paper losses of Lehman's CEO stood out among those of financial executives.<sup>n21</sup> Similarly, in a Wall Street Journal editorial, Jeffrey Friedman relied on the Lehman CEO's large paper losses as a basis for his view that financial firms' compensation structures were not at fault for banks' risk-taking.<sup>n22</sup>

There can be little doubt that the banks' executives had strong reasons to prefer that their companies survive. Furthermore, the executives holding so many shares at the time of the collapse indicates that they had not foreseen in 2007 (or early 2008) that such a collapse was around the corner. The important question, however, is whether the executives had an incentive to make decisions that created an excessive risk - though by no means a certainty - of massive losses at some (uncertain) time down the road.

**[\*265]** In particular, excessive incentives to take risks might have been generated by executives' ability to cash out compensation based on the firms' short-term results. To the extent that executives did cash out large amounts of such compensation, their decisions might have been distorted by an excessive focus on short-term results. This problem, first highlighted several years ago in a book and accompanying articles co-authored by one of us,<sup>n23</sup> has received much attention in the wake of the crisis from both public officials and business leaders.<sup>n24</sup>

Properly examining this issue requires examining not only the losses Bear Stearns' and Lehman's top executives suffered as their firms collapsed, but also the compensation they derived in preceding years. Many of the decisions that ultimately led to the failure of the companies, such as the decisions to get heavily involved in the securitized assets markets, were made a substantial period of time before the final collapse. To assess the executives' incentives when they made decisions that determined the future risks facing their banks, one needs to look at their compensation over a longer period of time.<sup>n25</sup>

Some commentators who suggest that incentives did not play a role have assumed that the top executives of Bear Stearns and Lehman did not draw much cash out of their firms in the years pre-

ceding the crisis. Norris, for example, wrote in his New York Times column: "[Lehman's CEO] was later raked over the coals in Congressional hearings about his huge [\*266] compensation. That most of it was in stock and options that he never cashed in seemed to be something most legislators could not comprehend." n26

As shown in Parts III and IV, however, the top executives of both companies did in fact draw large cash flows during the years preceding the firms' demise. Lehman's CEO alone obtained cash flows of about \$ 470 million from equity sales during 2000-2007. More generally, the performance-based compensation drawn by the firms' top teams during 2000-2007 was sufficiently large that the total payoffs of these executives during 2000-2008, factoring in the value of their initial holdings in the firms, were decidedly positive.

### III. Cash Bonuses During 2000-2008

Because our focus throughout is on performance-based compensation, we put aside the cash flows to the top executives from their salaries. During the period 2000-2008, the top executive teams of Bear Stearns and Lehman received aggregate cash salaries of \$ 9 million and \$ 17.5 million, respectively. n27 Because these salaries were independent of performance, we do not take them into account in our analysis.

On top of their cash salaries, however, these top executives received sizable amounts of performance-based cash bonuses in the years 2000-2008, as shown in Table 1. The Bear Stearns and Lehman CEOs alone took home about \$ 87 million and \$ 61 million respectively. As explained in Part I, the numbers for executives 2 through 5 are biased downwards because some of them were not NEOs for each year 2000-2008 and thus their bonuses were not disclosed in the firms' proxy statements in every single year during this period.

Bear Stearns and Lehman chose to provide their top executives with large bonuses during the years 2000-2007 on the basis of the banks' high earnings and stock price increases during those years. Based on such short-term results, the firms awarded especially large bonuses during the 2004-2006 period. For example, in its decision to award bonuses for fiscal year 2006, Bear Stearns' compensation committee considered in particular [\*267] "record" earnings per share, net income, net revenues, large increases in book value per share, and the fact that "the market price of the Common Stock increased by approximately 37%" during the fiscal year. n28 Similarly, Lehman's compensation committee cited "record" net revenues, pretax income, net income, and earnings per share, as well as "an increase in the Firm's stock price of 17% during fiscal 2006, and 123% over the last five years" in its decision to award bonuses for fiscal year 2006. n29

For the year 2007, the compensation committee of Bear Stearns "determined not to award any bonuses to the members of the Executive Committee related to fiscal 2007 in recognition of the significant decline in our overall financial results from the prior year." n30 Lehman did continue to award cash bonuses (though at lower levels than in 2006), again citing "record" earnings per share, net income, and net revenues, as well as "successfully navigating the difficult credit and mortgage market environments and maintaining the Firm's strong risk controls." n31 What is most important for our purposes, however, is that neither bank's pay arrangements required its executives to repay cash bonuses for previous years when the banks collapsed in 2008. Accordingly, no part of the cash bonus compensation was clawed back even though the "record" financial results that served as a basis for the bonuses largely evaporated.

#### IV. Cash from Unloading Shares and Options, 2000-2008

During the years 2000-2008, the executives also took home large amounts of money from selling shares of their companies. Indeed, such sales were the most important source of cash outflows to the executives during this period.

In our analysis of the executives' benefits from equity-based compensation, we focus on the actual sales of shares of stock rather than the grant of such shares or options thereon. This is because any shares and options not yet sold became almost (Bear Stearns) or completely (Lehman) worthless when the companies collapsed. Hence the mere granting of shares and options during this period does not determine how executives fared financially over the 2000-2008 period. By contrast, any cash received for selling shares was unaffected by the subsequent crash of the banks. Of course, some of that cash income can be seen as merely executives' liquidation of wealth they already had in 2000, and we take this into account in Part V.

**[\*268]** We use for our analysis the proprietary Thomson Financial Insiders database, which builds on SEC filings on Forms 3, 4, and 5. n32 Thomson generally improves the data by cleansing misreported trades, in particular transaction prices. We identified at least one instance, however, in which Thomson's cleansing seems to have led to an overstatement of executives' cash receipts. n33 We want to err on the low side for cash receipts, and hence retain for each transaction producing cash receipts the lower of the cleansed and as-reported numbers.

Table 2 shows for each executive and year the amount received from trading in the companies' shares. The amounts shown are net amounts: we subtract from the dollar amounts received any amounts invested in shares during that year - either in the exercise of stock options or the purchase of shares in the market.

As Table 2 shows, during the years 2000-2008, the banks' top executives received substantial net cash proceeds from sales of their companies' shares, including from the exercise of options. Lehman's CEO took home about \$ 461 million, and Bear Stearns' CEO took home \$ 289 million. Looking at the top executive teams as a whole, their net cash proceeds from share sales exceeded \$ 1.1 billion in the case of the Bear Stearns team and \$ 850 million in the case of the Lehman team. Indeed, the large sales of shares throughout the period 2000-2008 are a key reason why the banks' executives were able to make net gains in the period as a whole, even though the value of their holdings took a considerable hit when the banks crashed in 2008.

A noteworthy feature of the pattern displayed in Table 2 is the regularity with which the members of the top executive teams were unloading equity positions. At both Bear Stearns and Lehman, the CEOs and executives 2-5 obtained net cash flows from unloading shares and options in each of the years 2000-2008. This pattern, of course, meant that executives had incentives to place some weight on short-term stock market prices throughout the period.

It is also interesting to note that most executives were able to sell more shares during the period 2000-2007 than they held at the end in 2008. Table 3 shows shares sold over the period 2000-2007 (adjusted for stock splits) in comparison to the amount of shares held in 2008. Each of the two top executive teams had one executive who left before 2008 and for whom holdings were not reported in 2008, so we omit these **[\*269]** individuals' sales and positions from Table 3; assuming they sold their shares at least as quickly as did other executives before 2008, our numbers understate the

extent to which the shares sold during 2000-2007 exceeded the shares held by the executives at the time of the firms' collapse. n34

It should be noted that both Bear Stearns and Lehman limited how quickly executives were able to unload equity awards, allowing such unloading to take place only five years after the making of the award. n35 Lehman, however, also granted stock options that could be exercised as soon as the stock price crossed certain thresholds, which it usually did within a year of the option grant. n36 In any event, the members of the top teams were all long-serving executives who became free each year to unload the equity incentives awarded to them five years earlier, and the [\*270] patterns displayed in Table 3 indicate that they made regular and substantial use of this freedom, unloading previously granted incentives as they were receiving new ones. The companies' top executives clearly had ample reason to pay close attention to and place considerable weight on their companies' short-term stock prices.

#### V. The Bottom Line

Table 4 puts together the total cash payouts, over and above baseline salaries, that the firms' top executives received during the period 2000-2008. We add to the cash flows from bonuses and from equity sales the value of the executives' remaining holdings after the crash.

The value of the remaining holdings is essentially zero for Lehman because common shareholders are unlikely to receive anything from the bankruptcy estate, as reflected in the near-zero stock price of Lehman when it was delisted. n37 As for Bear Stearns, we need to distinguish different types of holdings. Common stock held by executives was sold back to the company or converted into JPMorgan stock before or during the merger; these transactions are in the Thomson Financial Insiders database and already counted in the numbers we presented in Tables 2 and 3 above (using a monetary equivalent for JPMorgan stock, where applicable). n38 Options on Bear Stearns stock became essentially worthless because of the steep decline of Bear Stearns' stock price. n39 Vested phantom stock units, however, were to be exchanged for JPMorgan stock in two tranches around November 30, 2008 and January 15, 2009 under the terms of the merger and hence retained some value. n40 Using JPMorgan's stock price on the respective distribution date, we estimate this value to be \$ 11.7 [\*271] million for Bear Stearns' former CEO and \$ 17.5 million for the other NEOs. n41

The value of the remaining shares is thus relatively modest (for Bear Stearns executives) or non-existent (for Lehman's executives). As Table 4 indicates, however, the aggregate cash benefits from performance-based compensation obtained by the executives are quite sizable. This is due to the considerable value derived from cash bonuses and from sales of shares and options. All in all, we estimate that, during 2000-2008, the CEOs of Bear Stearns and Lehman received cash flows from bonuses and equity sales of about \$ 388 million and \$ 523 million, respectively; and the top executive teams obtained aggregate cash flows of about \$ 1.462 billion and \$ 1.014 billion, respectively.

Before concluding, it is worth comparing the cash flows derived by the executives with the value of the executives' holdings in their banks at the beginning of the period 2000-2008. Such comparison will provide us with the executives' net payoffs for this period.

To estimate the value of these initial holdings, we obtain most information directly from the companies' 2000 proxy statements, which report holdings as of September 8, 1999 in the case of



Bear Stearns and as of January 23, 2000 in the case of Lehman. n42 In Lehman's case, some of those securities might not have vested by January 1, 2000 and hence might wholly or partly be compensation for services rendered to the bank during 2000-2008. n43 This distinction is not clear-cut. Therefore, we count all securities, whether vested or unvested, so that our estimates of initial investments will be biased upwards (and so that our subsequent estimates of the executives' net gains during 2000-2008 will be biased downwards). We value all stock and phantom stock using the stock price as of December 31, 1999. n44

[\*272] As Table 5 indicates, the banks' executives had substantial initial investments in their companies' stock. For example, we estimate the value of the holdings of stock and phantom stock that the CEOs of Bear Stearns and Lehman held at the beginning of the year 2000 at \$ 360 million and \$ 195 million respectively. In addition, Lehman's CEO held options valued at \$ 106 million according to Lehman's proxy statement, which based this valuation on the excess of the November 30, 1999 stock price over the exercise price, if any. n45

In the case of Lehman, assembling the initial holdings information is complicated by the fact that three of the NEOs of 2007 on whom we focus in this Article were not yet part of that group in 2000, and hence their holdings were not yet disclosed in the proxy statement. n46 For these three individuals, we value their holdings instead at the point when they were first disclosed in Lehman's proxy. n47 This procedure is likely to produce an overestimate of the value of their holdings in 2000 (and thus, result in our underestimating the executives' net gains during 2000-2008). This is because (1) the number of shares the executives had in 2000 was likely lower than the number of shares they had when they first appeared in the proxy statements as named executives, and (2) the stock price of their company rose steeply during this period. In this sense, the numbers we give below are conservative in that they likely work against the possibility of finding significant net positive payoffs in the period 2000-2008.

A comparison of Table 4 and Table 5 shows the significance of the large amounts that the executives cashed from bonuses and equity sales during 2000-2008. Despite the large losses the banks' executives suffered on their holdings when their banks crashed, and after accounting for the value of the executives' initial positions in their companies, the net payoffs for the top executive teams during the 2000-2008 period were decidedly positive.

We estimate that Bear Stearns' top executive team made an aggregate net non-salary payoff exceeding \$ 650 million. Lehman's top executive team, in turn, made an aggregate net non-salary payoff estimated to exceed \$ 400 million. For the reasons we explained earlier, our estimates might be conservative. n48 Looking at individual members of the teams, our estimates indicate that, with one exception, each of the members of the two teams [\*273] ended up with a positive net non-salary payoff during the 2000-2008 period. n49 In sum, the top executives of Bear Stearns and Lehman, both collectively as teams and individually, benefitted from large amounts of performance-based compensation that made up for the decline in the value of their initial holdings and enabled them to fare much better than their long-term shareholders.

## VI. Implications

We have seen that during 2000-2008 the top executive teams received large amounts of performance-based compensation, which were large enough to provide them with net positive payoffs for the period, after accounting for the losses they suffered on their holdings at the beginning of this period. This conclusion might lead some to wonder whether the teams received excessive amounts

of performance-based compensation. Given that overall performance during the period under consideration was indisputably disastrous for the company's shareholders, some might view the executives' performance-based compensation levels as excessive. In response, others might argue that, even though this compensation was labeled performance-based, significant parts of it were in fact salaries. In Wall Street firms, so the argument goes, significant portions of an executive's performance-based compensation are, in fact, salary and are expected to be paid even if performance is abysmal. n50

In this Article, however, we would like to put aside the question of pay levels and whether they were appropriate or excessive. Our focus is instead on the issue of incentives. In particular, our chief interest is in whether the companies' pay arrangements provided their executives with excessive incentives to take risks.

In particular, we are now able to assess the positions of those commentators who use the Bear Stearns and Lehman examples as a basis for dismissing the possibility that incentives played a role in the firms' risk-taking decisions. Recall that, in their view, the large losses executives suffered when their firms collapsed indicate that their earlier risk-taking decisions were largely due to a failure to perceive risks, and thus, they [\*274] could not have been a response to excessive risk-taking incentives. Our analysis does not provide support for this view.

To the contrary, our analysis indicates that the cases of Bear Stearns and Lehman provide (if anything) a basis for concerns about the incentives executives had. The analysis indicates that the design of the firms' performance-based compensation did not produce a tight alignment of executives' interests with long-term shareholder value. Rather, the design provided executives with substantial opportunities (of which they made considerable use) to take large amounts of compensation based on short-term gains off the table and retain it even after the drastic reversal of the two companies' fortunes.

Consider the structure of the firms' bonus compensation. The executives were able to obtain large amounts of bonus compensation based on high earnings in the years preceding the financial crisis, but they did not have to return any of those bonuses when the earnings subsequently evaporated and turned into massive losses. Such a design of bonus compensation provides executives with incentives to seek improvements in short-term earnings figures even at the cost of maintaining an excessively high risk of large losses down the road.

Similarly, the cashing out of large amounts of shares and options by executives throughout the period provided those executives with incentives to place significant weight on the effect of their decisions on short-term stock prices. Such a design again gives executives an incentive to seek improved short-term results, which can lift short-term prices or prevent short-term price declines, even when doing so has the potential for adverse effects on long-term value.

We would like to emphasize that the question is not whether the firms' top executives fully anticipated such a collapse. Surely, the fact that the executives did not sell in 2007 all the shares they were free to sell indicates that they did not anticipate that a collapse of their firms was around the corner. The question is whether the executives - and executives in similar circumstances in other firms - had incentives to run the firms in a way that involved an excessive probability (though by no means a certainty) of large losses at some uncertain date down the road. Our analysis indicates that the pay arrangements at the firms - and similar pay arrangements elsewhere - did provide some such incentives.

That the firms' executives had incentives to take excessive risks, it should be stressed, does not imply that their decisions were in fact affected by such incentives. To begin, many individuals may be influenced by non-monetary motivations. Moreover, to the extent that the top executives of Bear Stearns and Lehman were "excessively optimistic" and did not, say, perceive any risks to their firms, their behavior would have been the same whether or not they had incentives to take excessive risks. Our analysis indicates that the executives' payoffs provided them with excessive risk-taking incentives, but it does not establish that these incentives in fact had an impact on the executives' decisions. Yet even though our analysis does not show these incentives in fact had an effect, it does show that concerns that this might have happened should not be dismissed - but rather taken seriously.

In any event, whether the risk-taking that took place in the past resulted from executives' misperceptions or executives' incentives need not be resolved for the important purpose of deciding what should be done going forward. Even if misperceptions and excessive optimism drove risk-taking during this decade, there is a good reason to get rid of incentives for excessive risk-taking going forward, lest they produce excessive risk-taking in the future.

One of the powerful lessons of economics is that incentives matter. When agents have interests that diverge from those of their principals, economists worry that the agents' incentives may lead them to act in a way that does not best serve the principals. The logic of incentives has led institutional investors and others to support pay packages that are quite large in order to enable the provision of strong incentives. Such packages come to address the widely accepted concern that, absent equity-based and bonus compensation, executives' interests will not be sufficiently aligned with shareholder interests. This logic, however, makes it essential as well to ensure that the design of performance-based compensation does not create perverse incentives.

Thus, firms and regulators would do well to devote considerable attention to examining how the design of performance-based compensation can better link the payoffs of executives with long-term results. As to bonus plans, the adoption of clawback provisions and bonus bank provisions should be considered. Such arrangements would prevent executives from pocketing in their entirety bonuses based on results in a given year when the results do not hold afterwards.

As to equity-based compensation, consideration should be given to refining its design to induce executives to place lower weight on short-term stock prices and greater weight on long-term stock prices. As we have seen, the top executives of Bear Stearns and Lehman were able to sell more shares during 2000-2008 than they were left with at the time of the firms' collapse. The executives' regular cashing out of equity incentives provided them with incentives to attach weight to short-term results.

Whereas Lehman's executives were in many cases free to unload options shortly after their vesting, companies would do well to place meaningful constraints on such unloading. As to shares, Bear Stearns and Lehman did have substantial limitations on unloading, which was permitted only five years after vesting. With such limitations, executives who are in their first or second year of service would not attach any weight to short-term prices. However, when a firm's top executives serve for many [\*276] years, as was largely the case with Bear Stearns and Lehman executives, such arrangements will not prevent executives who have served the company for a long time (and who consequently have some awarded shares they are free to unload) from placing a significant weight on short-term prices.

One way to ensure that executives place more weight on long-term stock prices is to require them to retain a substantial fraction of the shares and options awarded to them until retirement. This approach has been long followed by Goldman Sachs, which requires executives to hold 75% of awarded shares until they retire. n51 As one of us stressed in recent work with Jesse Fried, however, hold-till-retirement requirements provide executives with a counterproductive incentive to depart, and this incentive would be especially strong in the case of executives who have been successful and have amassed a large equity portfolio. n52 An alternative approach put forward in this work is to allow executives in any given year to cash out only a rather limited fraction, say 10%, of the portfolio of shares and options that they hold. n53 A comprehensive discussion of the optimal design of limits on the unloading of options and shares is, of course, beyond the scope of this Article. n54 But the analysis of this Article indicates that the importance of such reforms should not be dismissed.

### Conclusion

The stories of Bear Stearns and Lehman will undoubtedly remain in the annals of financial disaster for many years to come. To understand what has happened, and what lessons should be drawn, it is important to get the facts right. In contrast to what has been commonly assumed thus far, the top executives of those two firms were not financially devastated by their management of the firms during 2000-2008. They were able to cash out large amounts of performance-based compensation, both from bonuses and from share sales, during the years preceding the firms' collapse. This cashed-out performance-based compensation was large enough to make up the losses on the executives' initial holdings in the beginning of the period. As a result, the executives' net payoffs from their leadership of the firms during 2000-2008 were decidedly positive.

Thus, the large paper losses that the executives suffered when their companies collapsed should not provide a basis for dismissing either the possibility that executives' choices have been influenced by excessive risk- [\*277] taking incentives or the importance of improving compensation structures going forward. Legislators and regulators seeking to prevent future crises would do well to consider seriously the role of incentives in the financial crisis and the realigning of such incentives in the future.

[\*278]

### Appendix: Tables

TABLE 1: CASH BONUSES

	Bear Stearns		Lehman	
	CEO	Executives 2-5*	CEO	Executives 2-5*
2000	\$ 14,303,249	\$ 15,256,715	\$ 10,728,811	\$ 9,870,506
2001	\$ 5,927,920	\$ 17,952,389	\$ 4,768,899	\$ 5,186,178
2002	\$ 11,744,609	\$ 34,457,261	\$ 1,232,352	\$ 3,695,883
2003	\$ 12,633,503	\$ 37,562,958	\$ 7,630,983	\$ 11,647,290
2004	\$ 11,268,364	\$ 34,460,116	\$ 11,456,939	\$ 18,275,215
2005	\$ 13,753,111	\$ 42,674,147	\$ 14,865,419	\$ 26,109,081
2006	\$ 17,878,812	\$ 56,974,132	\$ 6,545,852	\$ 15,657,678
2007	\$ -	\$ -	\$ 4,327,911	\$ 11,965,401
2008	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -
Total	\$ 87,509,568	\$ 239,337,718	\$ 61,557,166	\$ 102,407,232
<b>Total Top 5</b>	<b>\$ 326,847,286</b>		<b>\$ 163,964,397</b>	

	Bear Stearns		Lehman	
	CEO	Executives 2-5*	CEO	Executives 2-5*

Source: Annual proxy statements for each bank and, for Bear Stearns in 2007, the amended 10-K. All amounts are inflation-adjusted to January 2009 dollars using the CPI, and relate to fiscal years, not calendar years.

\*Executives 2-5 are the other NEOs in the 2007 proxy statement of each respective bank. We are missing information for two Bear executives and two Lehman executives in 2000, for two Lehman executives in 2001, for one Lehman executive in 2002-2004, and for one Lehman executive in 2007; we treat all missing figures as zero values.

For Lehman executives in 2007, the numbers given also include "Non-Equity Incentive Plan Compensation." See supra note 27.

[\*279]

TABLE 2: NET INFLOWS FROM EQUITY SALES

	Bear Stearns		Lehman	
	CEO	Executives 2-5*	CEO	Executives 2-5*
2000	\$ 9,087,527	\$ 51,578,462	\$ 57,136,184	\$ 16,137,797
2001	\$ 37,351,798	\$ 119,906,815	\$ 38,444,262	\$ 43,949,470
2002	\$ 30,062,992	\$ 81,730,685	\$ 31,088,600	\$ 34,432,387
2003	\$ 67,400,196	\$ 250,500,025	\$ 52,770,933	\$ 39,981,325
2004	\$ 32,252,656	\$ 130,232,072	\$ 20,329,964	\$ 62,903,572
2005	\$ 25,128,912	\$ 106,092,399	\$ 98,565,177	\$ 71,694,762
2006	\$ 11,704,049	\$ 34,306,481	\$ 108,651,865	\$ 57,873,403
2007	\$ 15,445,977	\$ 32,667,187	\$ 53,544,175	\$ 62,332,550
2008	\$ 60,653,974	\$ 10,223,482	\$ 642,454	\$ 10,630
Total	\$ 289,088,081	\$ 817,237,608	\$ 461,173,614	\$ 389,315,896
<b>Total Top 5</b>	<b>\$ 1,106,325,689</b>		\$ 850,489,510	

Source: Calculations based on Thomson Financial Insiders database (supra note 32), counting the lower of as-reported and cleansed numbers, and counting both direct and indirect holdings. All amounts are inflation-adjusted to January 2009 dollars using the CPI.

\*Executives 2-5 are the other NEOs in the 2007 proxy statement of the respective bank. We are missing information for two Lehman executives in 2000-2001, for one Lehman executive in 2002-2004, for one Lehman executive in 2007, and for three Lehman executives in 2007; we treat all missing figures as zero values.

[\*280]

TABLE 3: SHARES SOLD, 2000-2007 VS. SHARES HELD, 2008

	Bear Stearns		
	CEO	Executives 2-5*	Total Top 5
Shares sold, 2000-2007	2,720,845	5,392,414	8,113,259
Shares held, 2008	5,658,591	1,124,363	6,782,954
Difference	2,937,746	4,268,051	1,330,305
	Lehman		
	CEO	Executives 2-5*	Total Top 5
Shares sold, 2000-2007	12,400,000	11,148,734	23,548,734
Shares held, 2008	10,851,590	7,903,508	18,755,098

	Bear Stearns		Total Top 5
	CEO	Executives 2-5*	
Difference	1,548,410	3,245,226	4,793,636

Source: For shares sold, calculations are based on data from the Thomson Financial Insiders database (supra note 32), omitting transactions without a reported transaction price (such as gifts). For shares held, holdings before sale are reported on the respective individual's first SEC filing - Bear Stearns' 2008 Form 4 and Lehman's 2008 Proxy Statement. All numbers include indirect holdings and are adjusted for stock splits. All amounts are inflation-adjusted to January 2009 dollars.

\* Executives 2-5 are the other NEOs in the 2007 proxy statements, except that data for Spector (Bear Stearns) and Goldfarb (Lehman) are excluded because they did not report holdings in 2008.

## [\*281]

TABLE 4: TOTAL CASH FLOWS FROM BONUSES AND EQUITY SALES, 2000-2008

	Bear Stearns	
	CEO	Executives 2-5*
Bonuses	\$ 87,509,569	\$ 239,337,718
Sales of stock	\$ 289,088,081	\$ 817,237,608
Stock remaining	\$ 11,656,420	\$ 17,494,360
Total	\$ 388,254,070	\$ 1,074,069,686
Total Top 5	\$ 1,462,323,756	
	Lehman	
	CEO	Executives 2-5*
Bonuses	\$ 61,557,166	\$ 102,407,231
Sales of stock	\$ 461,173,614	\$ 389,315,896
Stock remaining	\$ 0	\$ 0
Total	\$ 522,730,780	\$ 491,723,127
Total Top 5	\$ 1,014,453,907	

Sources: For information on bonuses, see legend to Table 1. For information on sales of stock, see legend to Table 2. For information on post-crash holdings, calculations are based on holdings reported on SEC filings (Form 4) and stock prices reported on JPMorgan's website. All amounts shown are inflation-adjusted to January 2009 dollars.

\* Executives 2-5 are the other NEOs in the 2007 proxy statement of the respective bank. Missing figures for individual executive officers in any given year are treated as zero values (see Tables 1 and 2).

## [\*282]

TABLE 5: ESTIMATED VALUE OF INITIAL HOLDINGS

	Bear Stearns		Lehman	
	CEO	Executives 2-5*	CEO	Executives 2-5*
Initial stock	\$ 360,277,489	\$ 437,934,567	\$ 194,570,847	\$ 194,778,981
Initial			\$ 106,197,280	\$ 105,654,222

	Bear Stearns CEO	Executives 2- 5*	Lehman CEO	Executives 2-5*
options				
Total	\$ 360,277,489	\$ 437,934,567	\$ 300,768,127	\$ 300,433,203
Total Top 5	\$ 798,212,056		\$ 601,201,330	

Source: Calculations based on CRSP stock prices (supra note 15) and holdings reported in Bear Stearns' 1999 proxy statement and Lehman's 2000 (Fuld, Gregory), 2003 (Russo), 2004 (Goldfarb), and 2007 (O'Meara) proxy statements. Stock amounts include phantom stock and are valued at the December 31, 1999 stock prices (except that the holdings of Goldfarb, O'Meara, and Russo are valued at the January 31 stock price of the year when their holdings were first disclosed). Option values are "naive" calculations of  $\max [0, (\text{exercise price} - \text{current stock price})]$  as reported in the respective proxy statements. All amounts shown are inflation-adjusted to January 2009 dollars.

\* Executives 2-5 are the other NEOs in the 2007 proxy statements.

### Legal Topics:

For related research and practice materials, see the following legal topics:

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Criminal Offenses  
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Neglect of Office  
General Overview  
Real Property Law  
Inverse Condemnation  
Regulatory Takings  
Tax Law  
Federal Income Tax Computation  
Tax Accounting  
General Overview

### FOOTNOTES:

n1. But see infra notes 7, 8, 10 and accompanying text.

n2. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 7001, 123 Stat. 115, 516-20 (to be codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5221).

n3. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Announces New Restrictions on Executive Compensation (Feb. 4, 2009), available at <http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg15.htm>.

n4. See Corporate and Financial Institution Compensation Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 3269, 111th Cong. (as passed by the House, July 31, 2009).

n5. Federal Reserve System, Proposed Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,227 (Oct. 27, 2009).

n6. Leaders' Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit, Sept. 24-25, 2009, <http://www.pittsburghsummit.gov/mediacenter/129639.htm>; see also Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Enhancements to the Basel II Framework 25-27 (2009).

n7. See Compensation Structures and Systematic Risk: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 4-6 (2009) (statement of Kevin J. Murphy, Kenneth L. Trefftz Chair in Finance, University of Southern California); Rudiger Fahlenbrach & Rene Stulz, Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis 18 (Charles A. Dice Ctr. for Research in Fin. Econ., Working Paper No. 2009-13, 2009).

n8. Joseph Grundfest, What's Needed Is Uncommon Wisdom, N.Y. Times DealBook Dialogue, Oct. 6, 2009, <http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/06/dealbook-dialogue-joseph-gundfestuncommon-wisdom>.

n9. See, e.g., sources cited *infra* notes 10 & 22.

n10. Floyd Norris, It May Be Outrageous, but Wall Street Pay Didn't Cause This Crisis, N.Y. Times, July 31, 2009, at B1.

n11. See Regulation S-K, Item 402(a)(3), 17 C.F.R. § 229.402; Schedule 14A, Item 8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (2009).

n12. At Bear Stearns, the team includes: James Cayne, CEO from 1993 through January 2008 and chairman of the board from June 2001 through 2008; Alan Greenberg, chairman of the executive committee from 2001 through 2008 and previously chairman of the board; Samuel Molinaro, CFO from 1996 through 2008 and COO from August 2007 through 2008; Alan D. Schwartz, co-COO from June 2001 until August 2007, CEO from January 2008 until the merger with Bank of America, and a director since 1987 (except 1996-1999); and Warren Spector, co-COO from June 2001 until August 2007. For the membership of these persons in the group of NEOs, see The Bear Stearns Co., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 19 (Mar. 27, 2007) [hereinafter Bear Stearns, 2007 Proxy]. For the first four's positions within the companies, see *id.*; and The Bear Stearns Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K/A), at 6-18 (Mar. 31, 2008) [hereinafter Bear Stearns, 2008 Form 10-K/A]. For Spector's position, see Bear Stearns, 2007 Proxy, at 19; The Bear Stearns Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 32 (Feb. 13, 2007) [hereinafter Bear Stearns, 2007 Form 10-K]; and The Bear Stearns Co., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Nov. 15, 2007) [hereinafter Bear Stearns, 2007 Form 8-K]. At Lehman, the team includes: Richard Fuld, CEO from 1993 through 2008 and chairman of the board from 1994 through 2008; David Goldfarb, CFO from 2000 through 2004 and CAO from 2004 through 2006; Joseph Gregory, (co-)COO from 2002 through 2008 and CAO from 2000 through 2002; Christopher O'Meara, CFO from 2004 through 2007 and previously in various management positions at the firm (since 1994); and Thomas Russo, CLO from 1993 through 2008. Fuld and Gregory were NEOs throughout the 2000-2008 period, Russo from 2003 through 2008, Goldfarb from 2004 through 2007, and O'Meara in 2007 and 2008. For the membership of these persons in the group of NEOs, see Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 21 (Feb. 26, 2007) [hereinafter Lehman, 2007 Proxy]. For the



positions of these individuals within the firm, see Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (Feb. 27, 2006) [hereinafter Lehman, 2006 Proxy]; Lehman, 2007 Proxy; and Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 5, 2008) [hereinafter Lehman, 2008 Proxy].

n13. As we discuss in Part V, we do not have information about some executives' holdings in 2000, and we make conservative assumptions in these cases as well.

n14. See James E. Cayne, Statement of Changes in Beneficial Ownership (Form 4) (Mar. 27, 2008) (filing with respect to Bear Stearns).

n15. The stock price data used in this calculation come from the proprietary Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Daily Stock file database, available at <http://wrds.wharton.upenn.edu> (last visited Sept. 23, 2010) [hereinafter CRSP].

n16. Bear Stearns' former CEO may have incurred additional losses on restricted and phantom stock of Bear Stearns that he still held at the time of the sale, but, based on Bear Stearns' 2007 proxy statement, such losses would presumably have been less than 20% of the losses he incurred on his holdings of common stock. Cf. Bear Stearns, 2007 Proxy, *supra* note 12, at 10 (reporting that the CEO's phantom and restricted stock holdings amounted to about 10% of his common stock holdings); *id.* at 20 (reporting that the value of unexercised in-the-money options was about \$ 60 million).

n17. See Lehman, 2008 Proxy, *supra* note 12, at 18. According to SEC records, none of these shares were sold prior to Lehman's bankruptcy filings, as any such sale would have had to be reported to the SEC, yet the SEC has no record of sales for Lehman's CEO from December 2007 until after Lehman's bankruptcy filing on September 15, 2008. See Securities & Exchange Commission, Filings of Richard S. Fuld, Jr., <http://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?CIK=0001227421&action=getcompany> (last visited Mar. 23, 2010). Indirectly held shares include 1.25 million held by family members, trusts for the benefit of family members, and grantor retained annuity trusts. See Lehman, 2008 Proxy, *supra* note 12, at 19. The number given in the main text includes restricted and phantom stock. See *id.* At least 4.6 million of these shares were vested as of January 31, 2008, and none of these shares were sold prior to Lehman's bankruptcy filings. See *id.* at 34.

n18. On the day of Lehman's bankruptcy filing, the chairman and CEO sold 2.98 million of those shares for prices of around \$ 0.20 per share, or approximately \$ 600,000 total. See Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc., Statement of Changes in Beneficial Ownership (Form 4) (Sept. 17, 2008). Three days later, he sold another 287,415 shares for \$ 0.07 per share, or \$ 21,125 total. See Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc., Statement of Changes in Beneficial Ownership (Form 4) (Sept. 22, 2008).

n19. See CRSP, *supra* note 15.

n20. Norris, *supra* note 10.

n21. *Id.* (relying on data from Fahlenbrach & Stulz, *supra* note 7).

n22. Jeffrey Friedman, Bank Pay and the Financial Crisis, *Wall St. J. Online*, Sept. 28, 2009, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204488304574429293838639418.html>.

n23. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, *Pay Without Performance* (2004); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, *Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues*, 17 *J. Applied Corp. Fin.* 8 (2005); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, *Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem*, *J. Econ. Persp.*, Summer 2003, at 71; Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried & David I. Walker, *Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation*, 69 *U. Chi. L. Rev.* 751 (2002).

n24. See, e.g., Lloyd Blankfein, *Do Not Destroy the Essential Catalyst of Risk*, *Fin. Times*, Feb. 8, 2009, at 7 ("An individual's performance should be evaluated over time so as to avoid excessive risk-taking. To ensure this, all equity awards need to be subject to future delivery and/or deferred exercise. Senior executive officers should be required to retain most of the equity they receive at least until they retire, while equity delivery schedules should continue to apply after the individual has left the firm."); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Statement by Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner on Compensation (June 10, 2009), available at <http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg163.htm> (stating that "compensation should be structured to account for the time horizon of risks"). For a detailed analysis of how pay arrangements should be designed to address the short-horizons problem, see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, *Paying for Long-Term Performance* (Harvard Law & Econ. Discussion Paper No. 658, 2009), available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1535355>.

n25. While most observers have focused on the executives' paper losses at the time of the firms' collapse, the fact that one has to look earlier has been noticed by some. Those who have also made this observation regarding the relevance of the amounts taken home by the executives of Bear Stearns and Lehman in the years preceding the firms' collapse include Chair of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee Henry Waxman and former Wall Street analyst Henry Blodget. See *The Causes and Effects of the Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform*, 110th Cong. 1 (2008) (opening statement of Rep. Henry Waxman, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform); Henry Blodget, *Advice for Lehman's Dick Fuld: Take the Fifth*, *Bus. Insider: Clusterstock*, Oct. 6, 2008, <http://www.businessinsider.com/2008/10/advice-for-lehman-s-dick-fuld-take-the-fifth>.

n26. Norris, *supra* note 10.

n27. We obtain these and the following numbers directly from the banks' annual proxy statements and, in the case of Bear Stearns for 2007, its amended form 10-K/A. Bear Stearns, 2008 Form 10-K/A, *supra* note 12. These numbers are identical to those reported in the proprietary Standard & Poor's COMPUSTAT North America Executive Compensation database (ExecuComp), available at <http://wrds.wharton.upenn.edu> (last visited Oct. 10, 2009), with two exceptions. First, ExecuComp reports higher compensation for Bear Stearns executives in 2000 because it adds payments relating to a transition period in 1999 when Bear Stearns was changing fiscal years to payments reported for 2000. Second, ExecuComp does not report any bonus payments for Lehman executives in 2007, presumably because Lehman extraordinarily reported these "cash bonuses" as "Non-Equity Incentive Plan Compensation" in the "Summary Compensation Table." Cf. Lehman, 2008 Proxy, *supra* note 12, at 26-28.

n28. Bear Stearns, 2007 Proxy, *supra* note 12, at 15.

n29. See Lehman, 2007 Proxy, *supra* note 12, at 19-20.

n30. See Bear Stearns, 2008 Form 10-K/A, *supra* note 12, at 9.

n31. See Lehman, 2008 Proxy, *supra* note 12, at 25.

n32. See Thomson Reuters, Insider Filing - Table 1. Stock Transactions, <http://wrds.wharton.upenn.edu> (last visited Dec. 12, 2009) [hereinafter Thomson Reuters].

n33. The cash receipts of Lehman's CEO after his company's bankruptcy filing on September 15, 2008 seem to be overstated by about \$ 10 million in Thomson's cleansed data. Thomson reports a transaction price of \$ 3.65 for transactions executed on September 15, while the original SEC filings report transaction prices of around \$ 0.20. The latter appears to be accurate, while the higher price of \$ 3.65 seems to refer to the pre-bankruptcy price prevailing on September 12, 2008. See *id.*

n34. It is also worth emphasizing that the above sales must include sales of shares that the executives had previously received as compensation from their banks while these were public companies, rather than only relating to shares that they had previously purchased on the open market or received prior to the banks' initial public offerings (IPOs). For example, Lehman's CEO could have obtained at most \$ 103 million (in 2009 dollars) from selling the shares he already held at the IPO in 1994 or subsequently acquired through open-market purchases. He held 515,232 shares at the time of Lehman's IPO in 1994 and purchased an additional 645,440 shares in open-market transactions in the subsequent two years (both numbers are adjusted for subsequent stock splits). We calculated the maximum possible price of these shares using Lehman's peak stock price of \$ 85.80 on February 2, 2007. On Lehman's CEO's stock holdings at the IPO, see Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc., Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933 (Form S-1), at 72 (Apr. 5, 1994), which describes Richard Fuld's holdings of Lehman stock on the IPO date. We calculated the number of open-market purchases from

Thomson Financial's Insiders data, adding shares from all reported transactions in Lehman stock for Richard Fuld with transaction code "P," all of which occurred in the period 1994-1996. See Thomson Reuters, *supra* note 32. It is possible that some of the earliest reported transactions relate to shares that are already counted in Fuld's initial holdings on the IPO date. To the extent this is the case, we are overstating the number of shares that Fuld acquired by ways other than executive compensation.

n35. Cf. The Bear Stearns Co., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 9 (Mar. 2, 2001) [hereinafter Bear Stearns, 2001 Proxy] (explaining that executives' restricted stock awards received as part of their annual compensation will entitle the executives to receive freely transferable shares after five years); Bear Stearns, 2007 Proxy, *supra* note 12, at 17 (stating that "it is the Company's policy that executive officers are required to hold a minimum of 5,000 shares of Common Stock or Common Stock Equivalents"); *id.* at 16 (noting that equity-based components of bonus awards "are not freely transferable into shares of Common Stock ... for five years from the original grant date"); Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 14 (Feb. 26, 2001) [hereinafter Lehman, 2001 Proxy] (noting that restricted stock units awarded for fiscal 2000 "cannot be sold or transferred until they convert to Common Stock on November 30, 2005"); Lehman, 2008 Proxy, *supra* note 12, at 29 (noting that restricted stock units awarded for fiscal 2007 "cannot be sold or transferred until they convert to Common Stock at the end of five years").

n36. See, e.g., Lehman, 2001 Proxy, *supra* note 35, at 12-13 (explaining that options granted in fiscal 2000 were exercisable in 4.5 years, but that "vesting was designed to accelerate as the market price of the Common Stock increased to levels well above the market price on the date of the grant," and that "the price of the Common Stock increased significantly during Fiscal 2000, meeting these price targets, and such options became fully exercisable in accordance with their terms"); *id.* at 15 ("Five-year nonqualified stock options were granted on February 18, 2000 with terms providing for exercisability in four and one-half years and for accelerated exercisability in one-third increments if the closing price of the Common Stock on the NYSE reached \$ 42.50, \$ 47.50 and \$ 52.50, respectively, for 15 out of 20 consecutive trading days. These price targets were met during Fiscal 2000.").

n37. When it was delisted on September 17, 2009, Lehman traded at \$ 0.13 per share. See CRSP, *supra* note 15.

n38. For the sales information including the zero remaining holdings, see Cayne, Statement of Changes in Beneficial Ownership (Form 4), *supra* note 14; Alan C. Greenberg, Statement of Changes in Beneficial Ownership (Form 4) (May 23, 2008) (filing with respect to Bear Stearns); Samuel L. Molinaro, Jr., Statement of Changes in Beneficial Ownership (Form 4) (June 2, 2008) (filing with respect to Bear Stearns); and Alan D. Schwartz, Statement of Changes in Beneficial Ownership (Form 4) (June 2, 2008) (filing with respect to Bear Stearns). Warren Spector left the firm at the end of 2007. See Bear Stearns, 2007 Form 8-K, *supra* note 12. Hence, he was no longer subject to SEC holdings reporting requirements in 2008. To the extent that we are missing amounts he received for remaining shares (or for

phantom stock discussed below), we understate the amounts that the Bear Stearns executives received during 2000-2008.

n39. Bear Stearns options were converted into JPMorgan options at strike prices several times above the JPMorgan stock price then. See, e.g., James E. Cayne, Statement of Changes in Beneficial Ownership (Form 4) (June 2, 2009) (filing with respect to Bear Stearns) (noting that Cayne received JPMorgan options with exercise prices over \$ 178).

n40. The Bear Stearns executives also had unvested units of phantom stock, but the monetary value of these was relatively low, totaling only \$ 3 million for Greenberg, Molinaro, and Schwartz. See The Bear Stearns Co., Notice of Special Meeting of Stockholders (Form DEFM14A), at 6 (Apr. 28, 2008).

n41. JPMorgan's closing stock price was \$ 26.12 on December 1, 2008 and \$ 24.34 on January 15, 2009. See JPMorgan Chase & Co., Stock Price History, <http://investor.shareholder.com/jpmorganchase/stocklookup.cfm> (last visited May 4, 2010). For consistency with our previous calculations, we inflation-adjusted the November/December numbers to January 2009 dollars using the CPI, although the effect of this is obviously minimal. For the number and distribution date of JPMorgan shares to be distributed to each of the former Bear Stearns executives in replacement of their Bear Stearns phantom stock, see Cayne, Statement of Changes in Beneficial Ownership (Form 4), *supra* note 39; Alan C. Greenberg, Statement of Changes in Beneficial Ownership (Form 4) (June 2, 2008) (filing with respect to Bear Stearns); Molinaro, Statement of Changes in Beneficial Ownership (Form 4), *supra* note 38; and Schwartz, Statement of Changes in Beneficial Ownership (Form 4), *supra* note 38.

n42. Bear Stearns changed its fiscal year between 1999 and 2000, so that the next proxy statement did not appear until 2001.

n43. In the case of Bear Stearns, all securities awards seem to have vested immediately. Cf. The Bear Stearns Co., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 13 n.2 (Oct. 7, 1999) (reporting that all restricted stock awards vest immediately).

n44. Bear Stearns' stock price was \$ 42.75 on December 31, 1999; Lehman's was \$ 84.6875. The respective prices on the first trading day of 2000, January 3, were lower. On September 8, 1999, Bear Stearns' stock price was \$ 18.75 higher. On January 25, 2000, Lehman's stock price was \$ 14.125 lower. See CRSP, *supra* note 15.

n45. For options holdings of Lehman executives and Lehman's valuation method, see Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 18 (Feb. 24, 2000).

n46. These three executives are Goldfarb, O'Meara, and Russo. See *id.* at 16.

n47. For Goldfarb, O'Meara, and Russo, the relevant proxy statements are those of 2004, 2007, and 2003, respectively. We value the stock at the stock price on the day for which the numbers are given in the proxy statement, for example, January 31 of the year in which the proxy statement was distributed.

n48. See *supra* notes 12, 13, 33, 43, 46, 47 and accompanying text.

n49. The exception is Lehman's O'Meara, for whom we calculate a net loss of \$ 20 million. O'Meara, however, only became a NEO in 2007, so that earnings and trades are disclosed for only a few years and the initial holdings are valued at almost the peak stock price of early 2007. It is likely that a positive net benefit would be discovered in a full review of O'Meara's undisclosed compensation and initial holdings as of 2000.

n50. What incentives do firms have to label salary as performance-based compensation? They might try to camouflage the nature of compensation to hide it either from the IRS (for top executives, compensation in excess of \$ 1 million is deductible only if it is performance-based) or from shareholders (who might be more resistant to high levels of pay when compensation is not performance-based). On the taxation issue, see I.R.C. § 162(m) (2006).

n51. See, e.g., The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 34 (Feb. 21, 2007).

n52. Bebchuk & Fried, *supra* note 24.

n53. *Id.*

n54. For a detailed examination of this subject, see *id.*; Alex Edmans, Xavier Gabaix, Tomasz Sadzik & Yuliy Sannikov, Dynamic Incentive Accounts (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 15,324, 2009), available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1469118>.